Senator O’Brien

 

10.11am  -  12/10/00

 

 

 

 

Senator O'BRIEN  (Tasmania) (10.11 a.m.) --I rise to speak on the same matter of the Rural and Regional Affairs and References Committee's report entitled Air safety and cabin air quality in the BAe 146 aircraft. There are many things that Senators Woodley and Forshaw said that I can agree with. I would like to place on record my thanks to members of the secretariat and particularly the secretary, Andrew Snedden, for the work they have done in pulling together a series of complex issues in a report which attempts to reflect the views of the committee on those very complex issues. I thank the members of the committee secretariat for their work on the matter.

I want to focus briefly on the recommendations that go to the role of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, CASA, in this matter. Yesterday, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee handed down a report which was extremely critical of certain CASA officers and, in fact, called for CASA to consider whether certain actions should be taken against those officers in relation to another matter. I am not going to debate that now, but there is a bit of a common theme flowing through those reports in the sense that this report recommends that CASA reassess matters which they had previously assessed relating to the cabin fume issue. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority told the committee that they accepted the manufacturer's views and the operator's views on the issue of fumes and refused to act on a then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation's recommendation in relation to this aircraft. This is serious when you consider some of the evidence that we received. Indeed, on page 81 of the report, the committee notes a comment of Mr Lawrie Cox, Senior Industrial Officer of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots. I want to quote that, because that contains a bit of the flavour of what the committee was saying in relation to the role of CASA in this matter. Mr Cox is quoted in the report as saying this:

The role of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority throughout this process is, to say the least, appalling. ...

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has simply taken the advice of a commercial operator that is obviously protecting its basic interests as the regulatory authority, as being the basis of their position that there are no safety concerns in the operation of this aircraft and there are no health effects and no changes or effects on pilots' licensing. It is an unacceptable position from our point of view that the authority can take that stance, particularly with the amount of material that has been given.

Elsewhere in the report, the committee noted that a previous employee of CASA, Mr Best, had raised in a risk observation report matters which had come to him through the industry, where concerns were being expressed about the incidence of cabin fumes in this particular type of aircraft. On page 80 of the report, the committee notes the exchange between officers of CASA, particularly Mr Villiers, and Mr Best about the matter. I quote paragraph 4.97 of the report:

The Committee notes that CASA did respond to Mr Best's Risk Observation Report, but views with concern the response of Mr Villiers of CASA. Such a response would, undoubtedly discourage staff such as Mr Best from making further RoR's and this would be highly undesirable.

So what did the committee ask CASA to do? The committee recommended:

... that CASA should reassess matters recommended for further action by the BASI/ATSB incident report (No. 199702276) concerning the incident on 10 July 1997 involving Captain Kolver.

That was an incident where the pilot of a BAe 146 operating in a freight capacity experienced such problems, having been exposed to fumes, that he handed over control of the aircraft prior to landing. The committee recommendation goes on:

The Committee also recommends that CASA reassess its requirements for monitoring the operations and cabin and cockpit air quality of the BAe 146 aircraft operating in Australia and, where necessary, introduce regulations under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 specifying:

·a specific national standard for checking and monitoring the engine seals and air quality in all passenger commercial jet aircraft;

·maintenance procedures (including specific maintenance procedures for ageing aircraft);

·specific, appropriate maintenance and operational procedures for the BAe 146 which pay particular attention to the need to ensure aircraft are withdrawn from operational flying and serviced to ensure any operating faults resulting in oil leaks, fumes or smoke are immediately repaired;

·that incident reports should now be specifically designed so as to reflect the history of the cabin air problem that has been encountered on the BAe 146;

·sources of contamination in the cabin and cockpit environment in the BAe 146 be identified and further evaluated using appropriate sampling and analytical technology for the contaminants which, for example, might result from the burning of lubricating oil used in the BAe 146 engines;

·companies operating BAe 146 and other passenger commercial jet aircraft in Australia provide CASA with specific reports on the results of monitoring these matters within an appropriate timeframe, whether quarterly or six-monthly, in order that CASA can assess the operations of the aircraft; and

·air quality monitoring and compulsory reporting guidelines for all passenger jet aircraft operators.

They are extensive recommendations in relation to CASA. As I said, there is a consistent theme running through a number of matters before the committee which goes to the effectiveness of CASA--in this case, another incident where, in the view of this committee, CASA has not acted appropriately. As I said yesterday in relation to the ARCAS matter, the report of the committee said that CASA had not acted properly. In relation to this matter, the committee is also clearly saying that CASA has not acted properly. The committee has highlighted the concerns of people who either are or have been in the industry. There is ample evidence in the report of the concerns of crew members and former crew members about exposure to fumes in the cabin, and there is ample evidence of allegations of serious health effects.

Indeed, our attention was drawn to concerns which arose out of a workers compensation case in Queensland. This was evidence before the committee, and I think it was also noted in a Supreme Court case in Queensland. One of the doctors who operated on the Ansett panel to assess the danger of the fumes in the cabin was the assessor of a particular workers compensation claim in the Queensland jurisdiction--a claim which was rejected. The Supreme Court reflected on that, as does the committee in this report. That is one of the matters that led to a recommendation with strong support across the committee that the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, in cooperation with appropriate state ministers, appoint an experienced, retired judicial officer or eminent person to review cases such as the one we came across to ensure that justice is indeed done for people who have suffered the effects of cabin fumes where there is appropriate evidence that perhaps they should have been compensated and that perhaps their case was not dealt with appropriately because of the inappropriate participation of people in the review process or, alternatively, because the information was not available to allow them to succeed. I see that my time is up, so I finish by commending the work of the committee to the Senate and expressing my support for the report.

Debate (on motion by Senator O'Brien) adjourned.