Senator Knowles asked the Minister representing the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, upon notice, on 18 July 2002:

With reference to the Air Transport Safety Bureau Report 200103696 which cites two instances of cabin air contamination of the same aircraft, VH-NJA, on consecutive days and in both instances, the crew donned oxygen masks after being affected by contaminated air, and the cabin crew and passengers were affected by contaminated air:

(1)Why was the plane not immediately turned around when fumes were first detected.

(2)How are crew members who are wearing oxygen masks capable of identifying the source of the contamination.

(3)Is it not considered an emergency situation in which the aircraft should be landed as soon as possible; if not, what would happen if all crew members were seriously affected at the same time and unable to continue their duties.

(4)(a) How many flights were there between the two reported incidents; (b) why are the two incidents on the same report form; and (c) are they not two separate incidents.

(5)Given the documented illness of crew and passengers on the first flight: (a) why was there found to be no sign of oil contamination when initially inspected by the ground engineers; and (b) what was different between the engineering check after the first flight found `no signs of oil contamination or oil leaks,' and the next inspection, which `revealed oil contamination in the number 3 engine'.

(6)Given that, on 6 September 1999, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau issued recommendation R19990052 to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) that stated in part, `These deficiencies should be examined by the regulatory authority as part of its responsibilities for initial certification and continued airworthiness of the BAe 146 aircraft': Why then has CASA responded (more than 6 months later) that `CASA is satisfied that the BAe 146 aircraft in service in Australia are safe for public transport'.

Senator Ian Macdonald --The Minister for Transport and Regional Services has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's question:

(1)A response in any particular aircraft incident is a matter for the pilot-in-command and the aircraft operator. In this particular incident, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)'s investigation found that the crew troubleshot the problem in accordance with BAe Service Information Leaflet 21-45 as noted in CASA Airworthiness Directive BAe 146/86 and were able to eliminate the fumes by switching off the number-2 air conditioning pack. The flight was able to continue safely using only the number-1 air conditioning pack, with no fumes evident.

(2)BAe 146 Operational Notice OP 16 provides the procedures to be followed by the flight crew in the event of fumes in the cabin. Visible fumes can be identified while oxygen masks are worn and if they cease to be produced when one airconditioning pack is switched off, the source is identified. If fumes are not visible, masks should be worn by crew until the aircraft lands.

(3)Flight crew are required to don oxygen masks if there is any indication that there are fumes from the air conditioning system, as required per BAe 146 Operational Notice OP16. If the source of the fumes can be eliminated operational procedures may permit the flight to be continued to the planned destination. Not all fumes incidents are similarly serious and only a very serious emergency would lead to the need for landing as soon as possible, particularly if not at an airport normally open to the aircraft type. In this particular incident, the pilot-in-command was responsible for determining the seriousness of the situation.

(4)(a)There were a total of 11 flights between the two reported incidents, four flights on 6 August 2001 and seven flights on 7 August 2001.

(b)& (c) The two incidents were reported on two separate report forms by two different pilots and therefore logged at the ATSB as two separate incidents. Initial ATSB analysis indicated that both of the fumes events were the result of a bearing seal fault in the number 3 engine. An in-depth category 4 investigation was carried out in response to the second event that occurred on 7 August 2001 but with reference to both events. The first event, on 6 August 2001, was therefore logged as a category 5 investigation, for statistical purposes. The cabin crews and flight crews of both flights were interviewed during the information gathering process.

(5)(a)The inspection undertaken on 6 August 2001 was undertaken in accordance with CASA and British Aerospace Systems requirements. The reason the source of the fumes was not found during the first maintenance inspection could not be determined from the ATSB's investigation.

(b)The initial maintenance inspection of the airconditioning system, engines and APU that revealed no signs of oil contamination or oil leaks, highlighted the difficulty faced by maintenance staff in trying to trace the cause of reported fumes events. The identification of the failed oil seal and the subsequent engine change resulted from the CASA airworthiness directive requiring the operator to follow up the event with corrective maintenance action.

(6)The Government acknowledges that the issue of air safety and cabin air quality in the BAe 146 aircraft has received considerable attention, particularly following an incident in July 1997. In response to a recommendation made by the then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) following its investigation into the incident in 1999, CASA undertook an extensive review of the certification of the BAe 146 aircraft and concluded that the aircraft continues to meet the design standards applicable to the aircraft.

It should be noted that an aircraft is certificated against standards which apply at that time of certification. For example, the BAe 146 was certificated in 1983 by the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority against Joint Aviation Requirement 25 as existing at that time. Similarly the United States Federal Aviation Administration certificated the aircraft in 1983 against Federal Aviation Regulation 25.831 that existed at that date.

As a signatory to the Chicago Convention, CASA performs its functions in a manner consistent with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO Manual of Procedures for an Airworthiness Organisation Doc 9389-AN/919, Para 5.2.1 states: The airworthiness standards which were complied with are identified clearly in the Type Certificate/Approval and become the regulatory basis for the Certificate/Approval. These standards normally continue to be applicable to individual aircraft/components built in accordance with the design. The intention of ICAO is that the basis of certification continues unchanged through the life of the aircraft, not-with-standing subsequent changes in the certification standards.

When the certification standard for aircraft is enhanced, the new standard is seldom applied to existing aircraft. Only in exceptional cases is an enhanced standard applied retrospectively to existing aircraft.

CASA has also issued Airworthiness Directive/BAe 146/86, effective 3 April 2001, to mandate enhanced techniques for isolating sources of contamination and to implement improved maintenance procedures. The introduction of these requirements, in conjunction with improvements made by the aircraft's manufacturer, has led to a decrease in the incidence of fume events.