Senator Knowles asked the Minister representing the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, upon notice, on 18 July 2002:

(1)Why does the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) consider that an Australian Airworthiness Directive (AD) which `requires all operators to undertake inspections of oil contamination at intervals not to exceed 500 flights' is adequate, when that many flights could constitute around 125 days (at a rate of 4 flights per day) before any check is made.

(2)(a) How are the `inspections of oil contamination' undertaken and by whom; and (b) what empirical method is used for determining the presence of oil in the entire cabin air system.

(3)Given that there is considerable evidence of poor cabin air quality in Australia, why is it considered that Australia will have `a more timely and effective response into cabin air quality' if we wait for more international studies to determine the approach to be taken.

(4)Why would it be `premature to develop unique Australian cabin air quality standards at this stage'.

(5)Given that Australia has been at the leading edge of many aviation discoveries such as the black box, microwave landing system, slide rafts, doppler navigation, distance measuring equipment and T-VASIS (visual landing slope guidance), why can Australia not set the pace and determine corrective action that needs to be taken to eliminate the problem.

(6)The Government may have been `satisfied that the aircraft met the design standards applicable at the time of the introduction of the aircraft into Australian service,' however, given how much evidence is available about toxic fumes entering the cabins of BAe 146s: (a) why is the Government relying on out-of-date information to certify the airworthiness of the planes; and (b) who in the Government is satisfied today.

(7)Given that many crew and passengers are still getting sick: (a) how does the Government consider that `the modifications subsequently introduced by the aircraft manufacturer and incorporated by the airlines,' are adequate to resolve the problem sufficiently to be able to ensure the complete safety of crew and passengers; (b) what percentage of these modifications, have been completed by National Jet Systems; and (c) how do these modifications completely fix the problem.

(8)Why has Australia agreed to a further delay in remedying a fault that is causing illness among crew and passengers by establishing a `Reference Group'.

(9)(a) Why has the Government asked CASA to establish `a “Reference Group” ... that could monitor the appropriateness of these reporting arrangements in light of overseas developments'; (b) why is another inquiry being established to provide the same information that has been provided by all other Australian and overseas inquiries; and (c) when is this reference group due to report and to whom.

(10)(a) Who comprises the reference group; (b) will the group be quite independent; and (c) what are its terms of reference.

(11)With reference to the statement that, `air conditioning packs are subject to regular overhaul, the engine seals are replaced at frequent intervals and the air conditioning ducts are thoroughly cleaned or replaced at each servicing': (a) how many thousand hours is `regular'; (b) how frequent is `frequent'; (c) what is an example of `each servicing'; and (d) can it be guaranteed that the thorough cleaning and/or replacement have been carried out.

(12)(a) Why does `the Authority ... not propose to introduce additional maintenance requirements for the BAe 146 aircraft'; and (b) why does the Government consider `that maintenance procedures currently performed on the BAe 146 aircraft are appropriate,' when there is much medical evidence of sickness among crew and passengers.

(13)With reference to the statement that, `changes to the BAe 146 Aircraft Flight Manuals ... provide for improved procedures for the isolation of any source of fumes into the aircraft,' and that, `This process allows faulty components, such as leaky engine seals, to be isolated and the problem corrected at an appropriate time and location': (a) how can contaminated air be `isolated' when the air ducting has already been contaminated; and (b) what is considered an `appropriate time and location' for the problem to be corrected.

(14)Considering that crew members are too afraid of losing their jobs if they speak out about cabin air contamination, why is it that `a specific reporting mechanism for cabin air complaints is not considered necessary at this time,' even though, `there are already several types of incident reporting systems in place'.

(15)If the current structures are adequate, why have the problems not been rectified.

(16)Given that Australia appears to be at the international forefront of the BAe 146 air contamination problem with the Senate committee report and the report of Professor Chris Winder, why do we have to wait for third parties to catch up and report to us.

(17)Given that the average flight for a BAe 146 amongst the world fleet is 55 minutes, and that Australian BAe 146 aircraft average flight times are over double this and, that apart from the crew, passengers receive twice the world average oil contamination exposure, why can we not be world leaders in fixing this problem.

(18)Why has the Government asserted that there is `no causal link between contamination and health effects [that] could be substantiated using available data,' when a number of aviation experts and doctors have provided much learned information on the subject.

(19)How can such a statement be made when all traditional research on toxicity of the oil components on humans is based on conditions at ground level and not at an 8000 foot cabin altitude or after the oil has been burnt or modified through a jet engine.

(20)Why is the Government relying on the reference group to `consider whether a specific reporting mechanism needs to be introduced based on research currently under way,' instead of all the research that has repeatedly confirmed the problem.

(21)As CASA maintains that `Australian operators have already completed air circulation modifications that are designed to improve the cabin air environment of the BAe 146,' and `that National Jet Systems has also completed modifications to its aircraft': (a) does this mean that all National Jet Systems' planes have had all the modifications; if so, when was each plane modified; (b) have any aircraft had all the modifications; and (c) has there been any reported cabin air contamination in any of those planes since modification.

(22)With reference to the comments about testing conducted on aircraft VH-NJY: Is this the same aircraft that had both its wings so badly corroded that it had to be returned to the factory in England to be repaired; if so: (a) has this aircraft had any adverse reports made about it since its return to Australia; and (b) what were those reports.

(23)With reference to Airworthiness Directive AD/BAe 146/86, issued by CASA, which requires that, whenever oil contamination of the cabin air system is confirmed, a copy of the associated report be forwarded to CASA addressed to the Section Head, Systems: (a) how many such reports have been received since 3 April 2001 and on which aircraft; and (b) have there been multiple reports on the same aircraft.

(24)Given that contaminated air, once in the cabin air ducting system, cannot be `isolated', what useful purpose does the AD requirement of `[e]ither before further flight, or within 10 flying hours provided the source of the contamination is identified and isolated from the cabin air environment before further flight, using either flight operations procedures to maintenance procedures' serve.

(25)(a) Is Mobil 291 still toxic; (b) what specifically is the difference in composition of the new and old oils; (c) how many of the ingredients are listed on the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) Designated List of Hazardous Substances; and (d) is Mobil in full compliance with the regulations.

(26)Is the Government satisfied that Mobil 291 is safe when humans are exposed to it and its by-products.

(27)Why does the Government believe `it is not necessary to develop new codes covering fuel substances used by these aircraft,' when crew and passengers continue to get sick from cabin air contamination.

(28)Why does the Government believe `it is not necessary to develop new codes covering fuel substances used by these aircraft,' when the oil and its by-products have toxic properties.

(29)How is the Government sure that operators of all BAe 146 aircraft in Australia use Mobil 291 oil.

(30)(a) Does the Minister accept that the government's response to the toxicity of the oil is questionable; (b) does the Minister accept that the fact that `several of the ingredients used in ... Mobil jet Oil II are already listed on the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) Designated List of Hazardous Substances' and that this `is generally reflected in the regulatory framework of all Australian occupational health and safety jurisdictions' is an insufficient response; (c) is the Minister aware that there are two NOHSC standards used to classify hazardous substances, the list and the approved criteria; (d) does the Minister accept that even a simple application of both standards to the known ingredients in Mobil jet Oil II (as suggested by NOHSC in its own guidance material) show that this product is a hazardous substance; and (e) if this is all that needs to be done, is the Government prepared to do this.

(31)Why did CASA not issue the manufacturer's Service Information Leaflet in full as an AD regarding the cabin environment as a matter of occupational health and safety regardless of whether it would or could `establish a precedent where the Authority is involved with mandating various aspects of customer comfort, such as number of toilets, colour scheme, quality of food etc'.

(32)Given that there is evidence to suggest that flight crews have been seriously affected by contaminated cabin air on the aircraft, particularly during take-off and landing: (a) why is the Government supporting CASA's view not to mandate introduction of the modifications for all BAe 146; and (b) does the Government agree that such sickness among flight crew does in fact create `an unacceptable risk to safety'.

(33)(a) Does the Minister accept that aviation safety is something that someone outside this important industry would understand to cover all aspects of safety, including the health and safety of its workers, however, this does not seem to be how industry insiders see it--to them aviation safety is about making sure airplanes keep flying; (b) is the Minister aware of claims that Mr Toller, CASA's Director of Safety, arguably the highest aviation safety professional in Australia, thinks occupational health and safety is not CASA's business; (c) why is this so; and (d) given that section 28BE of the Civil Aviation Act (duty to exercise care and diligence) states that the holder of an Air Operators Certificate (AOC) must at all times take all reasonable steps to ensure that every activity covered by the AOC and everything done in connection with such an activity is done with a reasonable degree of care and diligence: If CASA will not look after the health and safety of workers in the industry, who is assigned to do so.

(34)Why does the Government consider committee recommendation 3 as unnecessary, given that the work allegedly carried out on all BAe 146 aircraft has allowed contaminated air to continue to flow into the cabins of some aircraft.

(35)What has been the outcome of the advice of the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations to his state and territory counterparts on the Workplace Relations Ministers' Council on the Senate committee's recommendation for future workers compensation and other insurance cases.

(36)(a) Why does the Government agree with the assertion made by the National Health and Medical Research Council `that the issue of aircraft cabin air does not meet the criteria against which urgent requests are assessed,' when part of the criteria is that `there must be a medium/high risk of threat to public health ... [and] the population at risk'; and (b) why does an excess of 2 million passengers per year not constitute a potential public health risk.

(37)(a) Why does the Government agree with the UK Committee that `triorthocresyl phosphate and volatile organic compounds ... have been found in such low levels that concerns about significant health risk are not substantiated,' when Australian experts in their fields conclude otherwise; (b) were the aircraft on which these tests were completed suffering from oil contamination at the time; and (c) were the tests carried out by an independent party that was free to choose how and which aircraft were to be examined.

(38)Given that changes to air-conditioning filters fitted `by Ansett were designed to remove the presence of odours in the cabin air environment,' but `National Jet Systems currently do not have filters fitted to their fleet': (a) as National Jet Systems operated more BAe 146 aircraft than Ansett, why did they not incorporate carbon filters; and (b) why is it that Ansett complied with all the manufacturer's recommendations but National Jet Systems did not.

(39)Even though the new filters may remove odours, how do they remove toxic gases from air entering the cabin.

(40)What useful purpose does `improving the galley air extraction and increasing the airflow in the aisle and vestibule areas', as done by National Jet Systems, serve if the air entering the cabin is contaminated.

(41)(a) How did the galley modification correct the air contamination problem; and (b) is that modification still installed on all the aircraft or has it been removed.

Senator Ian Macdonald --The Minister for Transport and Regional Services has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's question:

This answer is based on advice from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC), the National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS), and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).

(1)Airworthiness Directive (AD)/BAe 146/86 includes two inspection requirements: one after any suspected fume event; and the other at the fixed period of 500 flights as required by BAe Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.21-150. CASA believes these inspection requirements are adequate. In addition, recent advice from the aircraft's manufacturer indicates that due to the few problems being found during these inspections, it is considering whether the inspection interval can be extended.

(2)(a) - (b) A suitably qualified maintenance person must conduct the inspections in accordance with the procedures in the BAe ISB.21-150. ISB.21-150 provides information on detecting oil in the environmental control system.

(3)to (5) The issue of cabin air quality is not restricted to Australia and it would be inappropriate for CASA to initiate Australian unique regulatory requirements while international research that may lead to an internationally accepted approach to this issue is underway.

Nevertheless, significant work has already been done in Australia to address this issue. For example, despite operating only a small percentage of the world's BAe 146 fleet, Ansett developed all of the current aircraft modifications, which were then accepted by the aircraft's manufacturer and issued as the manufacturer's data. Ansett also instigated a comprehensive review of the quality of the BAe 146 cabin air, including convening a panel of Australian authorities.

(6)(a) - (b) In Australia, an aircraft is certificated against standards which apply at that time of certification. For example, the BAe 146 was certificated in 1983 by the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) against Joint Aviation Requirement (JAR) 25 as existing at that time. Similarly the United States Federal Aviation Administration (US FAA) certificated the aircraft in 1983 against Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25.831 that existed at that date.

As a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, CASA performs its functions in a manner consistent with procedures established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO Manual of Procedures for an Airworthiness Organisation Doc 9389-AN/919, Para 5.2.1 states: The airworthiness standards which were complied with are identified clearly in the Type Certificate/Approval and become the regulatory basis for the Certificate/Approval. These standards normally continue to be applicable to individual aircraft/components built in accordance with the design. The intention of ICAO is that the basis of certification continues unchanged through the life of the aircraft, not-with-standing subsequent changes in the certification standards.

(7)(a) - (c) BAe Service Information Leaflet (SIL) 21-45 identifies seven modifications, which comprise several sub parts, to improve cabin ventilation. The modifications have been carried out in a phased manner. All applicable modifications have been carried out on 22 National Jet Systems (NJS) aircraft and the last NJS aircraft was scheduled for the last set of modifications in October 2002.

Tests show greatly improved distribution of cabin air and qualitative assessments during aircraft tests.

(8)to (10) The Reference Group (RG) comprises representatives from CASA; Department of Transport and Regional Services; Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB); Aviation Safety Forum; National Occupational Health and Safety Commission; Qantas; NJS; Flight Attendants Association of Australia; Australian Federation of Air Pilots; Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association and Airline Passengers Safety Association.

The RG's Terms of Reference is as follows:

Scope:

The Cabin Air Quality Reference Group would be responsible for:

·Following the progress and analysing the outcomes of international research and developments and working co-operatively with other countries, major regulatory bodies and those conducting related research to develop a harmonised view of the cabin air environment; and

·Finalising any actions arising from the Government's response to the Recommendations of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report on Air Safety and Cabin Air Quality in the BAe 146 Aircraft.

Held on a six monthly basis in Canberra, or as required or agreed by the members of the Reference Group.

The Reference Group shall report, through the CASA Chairman, Mr Ted Anson AM, to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services following each meeting of the Group.

The Terms of Reference of the Reference Group and ongoing meetings of the Group shall be reviewed after four meetings of the Group, or as requested by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority will provide secretariat support for the operations of the Reference Group.

It will be the responsibility for each agency or representative body to meet the costs of its involvement in the work of the Group, including the costs of attendance at meetings.

(11)(a) - (d) As per AD/BAe146/86, Requirement 2, inspection, cleaning and replacement as required of the air-conditioning packs and the associated hardware are to be carried out per paragraph 2A of the BAe ISB 21-150 at 500 flight hour intervals. This scheduled activity is in addition to the inspection and replacement of components as required based on Requirement 1 of AD/BAe 146/86 when a cabin air contamination event is reported. Each of the above inspection and maintenance activities are carried out in accordance with the procedure determined by the aircraft/engine manufacturers and are certified by authorised maintenance personnel.

(12)(a) - (b) CASA does not propose to introduce additional maintenance requirements for the BAe 146 aircraft, as the Authority believes that the current maintenance requirements are adequate.

CASA is aware of work to improve cabin air quality and expects that in the near future, maintenance enhancements will be available to check for the presence of oil in the aircraft's sound absorber and introduce an improved number 1 engine seal to reduce the potential for fume events.

(13)(a) - (b) Early detection of any problem and rapid isolation of the source of the problem is vital in limiting any contamination of the total system. The amount of engine oil that can enter the system is believed to be small, which aligns with in-service experience. CASA has limited the time between isolation of the problem and correction of the problem, depending on the source of the problem. These procedures for isolating, reporting and repairing fume contamination events are detailed in AD/BAe 146/86.

(14)The Confidential Aviation Incident Report (CAIR) system, managed by the ATSB allows crew members to lodge confidential reports. These reports are provided on a confidential basis to CASA and do not name the individuals concerned.

(15)Since the introduction of AD/BAe 146/86 and the completion of modifications to the aircraft's ventilation system, there has been a decrease in the incidence of fume events.

(16)to (17) See response to questions 3, 4 and 5.

(18)to (19) The results of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review found that there was no causal link between contamination and health effects that could be found using the available data.

(20)A specific reporting mechanism for cabin air complaints is not considered necessary at this time, as there are already several types of incident reporting systems in place, including the ATSB's CAIR, CASA's Major Defect Report and the operator's own internal reporting procedures. However, the RG will monitor the appropriateness of these reporting arrangements in light of overseas developments.

(21)(a) - (b) See 7 above. The modifications are primarily intended to improve cabin air circulation. (c) There have been cabin air contamination events reported in these aircraft after the modifications were fully incorporated. It must be noted however that the modifications are not guaranteed to prevent contamination events from occurring. The modifications have focussed on improving the comfort of cabin crew, and AD/BAe 146/86 has focussed on isolating and identifying the source of the contamination to allow rectification within an appropriate timeframe.

(22)(a) Yes. (b) Four reported fume events.

(23)(a) 51 reports relating to aircraft VH- NJA, NJC, NJD, NJE, NJH, NJL, NJQ, NJR, NJT, NJU, NJW, NJX, NJY, YAD, YAE and YAF have been received. (b) Yes.

(24)Engine seal failures generally result in slow leak of oil, and the human olfactory system will normally detect the presence of such fumes very quickly. Any contamination of the cabin air ducting would be very small, if any, and the isolation of the contamination will allow the aircraft to be returned for maintenance within an appropriate timeframe.

(25) The Government considers that the Committee's recommendations directed at the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) to undertake substantive changes in relation to occupational health and safety (OHS) and workers' compensation arrangements, were misplaced. It is the States and Territories (and the Commonwealth in relation to its own employees) that have legislative responsibility for regulatory and operational matters concerning these arrangements. The Government's response to the Committee's recommendations and to the following questions on notice that may refer to NOHSC, have been framed against that background. (a) Mobil 291 has not been referred to the National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS) as a chemical of concern, hence no assessment of its toxicity has been undertaken. (b) The data is not publicly available to do a comparison of composition. (c) In the absence of information on the ingredients of Mobil 291, it is not possible to determine how many of the ingredients are on the List of Designated Hazardous Substances. (d) It is a matter for the relevant State and Territory regulators to determine whether Mobil is in full compliance with their respective regulations.

(26)The States and Territories have primary responsibility for regulating occupational health and safety, with the Commonwealth Government responsible for its own employees. Each OHS jurisdiction has established regulations that govern the usage, safe storage and handling of materials.

(27)to (28) The States and Territories, and the Commonwealth, regulate chemicals in respect of workplaces. Fuel substances, like other hazardous and/or dangerous chemicals, are covered by existing regulations and thus do not warrant additional legislation specific to fuels. These include the Codes of Practice for MSDSs and Labelling of Hazardous Substances, the National Model regulations for Hazardous Substances, the Approved Criteria for Classifying Hazardous Substances, and the National Standard and Code of Practice for the Storage and Handling of Dangerous Goods

(29)Operators may choose any engine oil that is approved by the engine manufacturer. Both Ansett and NJS implemented a programme to change their oil to Mobil 291. Since the tabling of the Government's response to the Air Safety and Cabin Air Environment report, the aircraft's manufacturer has withdrawn Mobil 291 from its list of approved oils, for use in Bae 146 aircraft, due to mechanical problems, and Australian operators of the BAe 146 are converting to the use of another oil.

(30)(a) No. (b) There are a range of Commonwealth, State and Territory regulations, national codes of practice and national standards that exist, which apply to Mobil Jet Oil II along with any other hazardous substances. (c) There is a single national standard used to classify hazardous substances, namely the Approved Criteria for Classifying Hazardous Substances (the Approved Criteria). The List of Designated Hazardous Substances (the List) is an advisory document that provides information on the hazard classification of chemicals to assist manufacturers and importers to meet their obligations under State and Territory regulations. (d) No. The hazardous nature of Mobil Jet Oil II has been determined by the manufacturer, based on available toxicity test data on the product, as required by occupational health and safety regulations. This classification against the NOHSC Approved Criteria indicated that Mobil Jet Oil II was not a hazardous substance. (e) See (d) above.

(31)CASA did not issue the manufacturer's SIL in full as an AD, as the Authority is not responsible for matters of occupational health and safety.

(32)(a) CASA has taken appropriate action by mandating certain actions to be taken in accordance with AD/BAE 146/86. In addition, the establishment of the RG, responsible for following the progress and analysing the outcomes of international research and developments and working cooperatively with other countries, major regulatory bodies and those conducting related research to develop a harmonised view of the cabin air environment is an important first step to developing a globally accepted approach to this issue. The Reference Group will continue to closely monitor this issue, and appropriate action will be taken when an internationally accepted approach to this issue is developed. The Government supports CASA's approach in regards to this issue. (b) Since the introduction of AD/BAe 146/86 with its resulting mandatory inspection and reporting requirements, there has been a marked decrease in the incidence of fume events. CASA does not consider that this constitutes an unacceptable risk to aviation safety.

CASA also notes that very few events have affected both pilots. Finally, if a fume event occurs, both pilots can use their oxygen supply, which is provided for such purposes, and they are then completely isolated from the cabin air environment.

(33)(a) - (d) CASA's powers and functions are defined in the Civil Aviation Act and do not include occupational health and safety. Employers in the aviation industry (including CASA in relation to its own employees) are responsible for the occupational health and safety of their workers through the duty of care provisions in relevant Commonwealth, State and Territory OHS legislation. The States and Territories (and the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission in relation to Commonwealth employees) are responsible for enforcing/regulating this duty of care.

(34)The Government's position is clear in the response.

(35)The Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations proposes to bring this matter to the attention of the Workplace Relations Ministers' Council's next meeting on 8 November 2002.

(36)The NHMRC determines research priorities (under the NHMRC Act, Part 2 Section 10(2). The Council cannot be directed by the Minister `to recommend the allocation of research funds to a particular person, organisation, State or Territory'). NHMRC determined this did not meet the criteria.

(37)As indicated previously, the Government is seeking to adopt an internationally harmonised approach to this issue.

(38)(a) - (b) The introduction of carbon filters was a commercial decision for the operator; there was no manufacturers' recommendation.

(39)The filters fitted by Ansett were designed to only remove the presence of odours in the cabin air environment.

(40)Oil leaks from the engine is found to depend among other things on the flight phase, engine thrust levels and aircraft attitude. An adequate ventilation system can ameliorate the contamination that might have entered the cabin in any of those transient situations. The modifications carried out by NJS improve the cabin air environment by removing the galley air, and hence galley odours, directly from the aircraft and increasing airflow in the aisle and vestibule areas.

(41) (a) Food processing and the use of dry ice in the galley area is considered to be a contributor to cabin air contamination and hence ventilation is improved in this area to reduce contamination. The modifications carried out by NJS improve the cabin air environment by improving the galley air extraction and increasing airflow in the aisle and vestibule areas. Since the introduction of AD/BAe 146/86 with its resulting mandatory inspection and reporting requirements and the completion of modifications carried out by the aircraft's operators, there has been a decrease in the incidence of fume events. (b) Yes, it is still installed.