House of Lords Enquiry, 2007
Name: John Grahame Hoyte.
Address: xxxx
Tel: xxxx e mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
Background: Former BAe 146 Training Captain.
Presently: Chairman Aerotoxic Association. (www.aerotoxic.org)
1. 1979 – 1987 Aerial crop spraying pilot. Dealing with chemicals and dangerous flying. No health problems.
2. 1987 – 1989 Flying DC 3’s & Cessna Twins. Freight and Maritime pollution patrol aircraft. No health problems.
3. 1989 – 1998 Flying BAe 146’s for TNT, an overnight parcel delivery Company.
4. I experienced gradual ill health with the following symptoms: poor memory, speech difficulties, degraded thought processing, character change, internal head pressure, chronic fatigue (which was universally blamed on the nature of job with its anti social hours) all of which created mild depression. Fatigue became so bad that I decided to leave for a day time flying job but stayed on the BAe146 as my memory was so poor, that I thought that I would be unable to learn a new aeroplane type. I investigated other types of work. The slow change to poor health was never admitted to my GP or family and I know now that there would have been no understanding of the real reason and even less chance of the correct remedy; which is of course, to stop flying.
5. Privately I put my gradual ill health down to possible CJD or early dementia. My family blamed the anti social flying hours, which clearly did not help.
6. 1998 – 2005 Flying BAe 146’s for Flybe on Air France contract and passenger airline. I took an approximate 15% pay cut. Symptoms all gradually intensified until saturation point. On reflection, I should not have been flying from 2004 onwards or even earlier.
7. In 2001 I became a Training Captain but nearly failed the course as my memory and speech were so poor. I knew people couldn’t understand why I was not performing ‘as expected’. A 10 minute video was made of me presenting at the training course.
8. On 19th March 2004 I elected not to fly two extra sectors due to safety concerns after the planned early morning start and four sectors had been completed on my wife’s birthday. This was due to exhaustion and a previously planned social event with family, being threatened. Flybe criticised me for causing ‘extra operational chaos’ and as a direct consequence, I decided to go ‘part time’ with a 75% roster and 25% pay cut.
9. Unfortunately I had also told the Operations Director on the phone that: ‘Somebody’s going to get killed’ on 19th March 2004.
10. On 25th August 2004 I witnessed a very experienced colleague make many serious, out of character mistakes on a formal ‘line check’ in flight and reported it immediately to the Chief Trainer, Captain Graham Bond; as I was very concerned at what I had witnessed. This is not officially recorded anywhere, but it did happen.
11. A few days later on 29th August, after a very difficult week, I elected not to fly a Public Transport Flight to Saltsburg in the Austrian Alps with bad weather in the co pilot’s seat, as I doubted my ability to act as a fit crew member due to the frequent roster changes and feeling very unwell on board the BAe 146 on the day.
12. I did fly (very carefully) the next day as Captain.
13. I was then grounded by the CAA Doctors and Professor Gordon Turnbull who finally diagnosed ‘operational stress’ – which he was very concerned about and PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), which I was slightly surprised at, as I hadn’t had a trauma but more a difficult period. I took myself off flying (even when declared fit in October 2004 by the Doctors) until January 2005.
14. During this time I was criticised by Flybe for not setting a good example to other junior pilots and got little support from the CAA.
15. I went back to flying the BAe 146 in February 2005 75% part time and with no training responsibility. Another decline in my salary and status. By now I was determined to find another job and started to study Health and Safety, so that I could hopefully work in my wife’s Company – at the time.
16. On June 30th 2005 I was Captain of a BAe 146 that had a smoke incident flying from Birmingham to Edinburgh caused by an overheating electric motor. As an affected crew we elected not to fly the next two flights from Birmingham to Brest. We wrote an ASR report, were tested at the local medical centre and carried on with our increasingly difficult rosters, which often changed frequently during each day.
17. On 8th July 2005 I received a phone call from Flybe on a ‘Day off’, accusing me of flying from Edinburgh to Birmingham ‘whilst sick’, which is illegal.
18. I told them that I would not be flying any more until the whole issue had been resolved. I have never flown since.
19. I then visited the Company Doctor, who had never heard of the BAe 146 fume problems, which made me very concerned. He was not helpful at all and wrote a very critical report.
20. I visited my GP frequently, as I was signed off with ‘work related stress’, who tried to help by offering anti depressants, which I refused as I have never felt ‘depressed’, just ill.
21. I visited Professor Turnbull the CAA psychiatrist again, who offered me prozac. I refused to take it and went to the gym and got fit instead.
22. I am convinced that by not taking these drugs, I have been able to recover much quicker.
23. My GP signed me off until February 2006 when I was officially diagnosed with ‘chronic stress’ by Professor Bagshaw. I repeatedly mentioned the possibility of poisoning during this period to many different ‘experts’, which is documented, but nobody accepted that there was any chance of it - in my case.
24. I now know that they were being extremely economical with the truth. I knew no different or felt well enough to be able to challenge them.
25. In January 2006 Flybe decided not to discipline me and formally absolved me of ‘flying whilst sick’; this was personally very important to me as I take a pride in following the rules.
26. I tried to become a driving instructor in February 2006 but failed the initial driving test. I gave up immediately, knowing that I was still unwell with my flying career in ruin.
27. Professor Bagshaw’s report enabled me to get a Loss of Licence payment.
28. In January 2006 I was contacted by Tristan Loraine then of BALPA to ask if I would like to take part in a study programme by UCL. I agreed to take part as in April 2005 I had become aware of the BALPA conference in London and had begun to reason that I may have been affected. I was keen to contribute data to the study.
29. In March / April 2006 I was tested by UCL and Bio Lab.
30. In May 2006 I got the results which showed that I had abnormal blood / fat results with OP content and cognitive deficits along with all of the other 26 pilots.
31. I know many pilots who were not tested as either English was not their Mother tongue or they couldn’t afford the £433 for the blood / fat test.
32. I had lost all of my income by this point.
33. In May 2006 I signed a statement and handed it to a Lawyer for safe keeping that I had reason to believe that I had been poisoned by flying the BAe 146.
34. In June, July August of 2006 I wrote to the Prince of Wales to advise him of the situation, only to be reassured that the COT committee were investigating the issue. Unknown to me at the time, another Senior Doctor had taken identical action.
35. In August 2006 a fatigue specialist, Dr Nicola Hembry of Bristol confirmed that I had been subject to numerous stress factors of which low level chronic poisoning was definitely present. She advised me not to re expose myself.
36. I can confirm that I have never been asked by the COT committee or anybody else, exactly what happened to me in any detail whatsoever, apart from the UCL research. I have however taken it upon myself to give the COT committee all of my results; they in turn do not accept the Bio Lab results but have accepted that even Bio Labs results should be comparable over time.
37. I also tried to attend two COT meetings but was denied access; my MP, Mr John Maples eventually made sure that I could go along as an ‘observer’, specifically not being allowed to present any evidence whatsoever, along with several other pilots who have been affected.
38. I first saw my MP, Mr John Maples, in late 2005 complaining of measurable economy measures in ‘low cost’ flying and its apparently hidden, harmful effects on aircrew in terms of extreme roster disruption and serious stresses. I made no mention of OP poisoning to him as I reasoned that we wouldn’t be able to understand such a claim and I was unaware that the issue had been debated in the House of Lord and Commons at this stage or that a BAe 146 pilot had been grounded by the CAA due to OP poisoning in December 2000.
39. My MP is very aware of the situation now and assisting me with many aspects of my case.
40. On 31st December 2006 I eventually left Flybe’s employment with an undisclosable financial settlement ; I also had to sign a Compromise Agreement, with a fair reference from Flybe for any future employment.
41. I was generally sceptical of the fume issue until May 2006; as with many people I had no firm reason to believe that it had affected me despite knowing that I had health invisible problems of some description.
42. I had no idea who to report such ill health to and knew that my job and family were at risk by admitting that I thought I had CJD or early dementia.
43. My parents are both still alive in their 80’s and are well.
44. In the past year I have been made aware of many other pilots, cabin crew and passengers who have had near identical experiences to me, some much worse, some not as bad and some not at all.
45. I changed my GP twice in 2006 as both refused to understand what I was telling them and my new GP was sceptical initially too. I also wrote to the Director of Public Health in Warwickshire, but he refused to see me, simply saying that the matter was now in the hands of the COT committee – don’t worry.
46. The CAA are also content to ignore any ‘expert aircrew’ evidence and refuse to discuss it, whilst they wait for the COT committee declare their ‘expert’ findings. The CAA failed to even attend the BALPA conference in 2005.
47. During my time flying the BAe 146 I was constantly aware of fumes, sometimes visible and of 10 minutes duration, in the aeroplane. These were most especially from the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) on the ground on the first flight of the day. It was ‘normal’. I think I only twice entered a technical defect in the Tech Log:
48. On 31st December 2002 when the entire cabin filled with smoke after a report of fire in the rear toilet and we carried out an emergency landing back into Birmingham but subsequently refused to fly a replacement aeroplane when told to do so. We did not use oxygen on that occasion, as it would have been an extremely difficult procedure, if oxygen had been used; there was no smoke whatever on the flight deck, so we left it off. We had (un)intentionally broken the first rule of a smoke drill. OXYGEN - ON.
49. Secondly, on 30th June 2005 after the Birmingham – Edinburgh flight, but this was caused by an overheating electric motor at the rear of the aircraft.
50. Both of these were recorded as ASR’s (Air Safety Reports).
51. It must be remembered that after a very long day flying, with no allowed rest breaks, the last thing that pilots want to do is write up apparently ‘normal’ or short term, repetitive events. What is the point?
52. I recorded my refusal to fly on 29th August 2004 as an MOR (Mandatory Occurrence Report) and yet I have been trying to get that report from Flybe and the CAA with any official conclusions under the Freedom of Information Act since September 2006, with no success; yet.
53. I have been made very angry by losing my vocational job, income and my health by being apparently poisoned. This is exacerbated by the knowledge that Boeing knows what the problem is, have found a solution in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner but can never admit it. Similarly, as with the Sheep Farmers and Gulf War veterans – the pilots can seemingly not be believed or the truth about OP poisoning admitted, almost by definition.
54. My family have found it almost impossible to understand what has been going on over recent years but my sister, Mrs Gillie Byrom, wrote a testimony in October 2005 at the height of my problems, describing my normal character and the clear change that she had witnessed in recent years.
55. I had the Bio Lab tests done again 12 months exactly after the first tests to personally try and monitor the situation. My GP is still unsure of why I am so keen to understand my past illness. I can confirm that Dr Sarah Myhill has detected a great improvement in my body chemistry which perhaps accounts for my health returning, more or less, to how I was in 1989, before I started flying the BAe 146.
56. At present, I am starting an Association for anybody, whether they are pilots, cabin crew or passengers who believe that they MAY have been affected by contaminated cabin air. This is crucial for many people who have lost their jobs, livelihoods and respect. These people have been abandoned and need urgent help which can only seem to be recognised by those who have experienced it themselves.
57. I have a paper work chain describing all of the above detail; this includes medical reports, e mails and other pilot witness statements which have never been published and accurately describes much still hidden evidence. This can all be supplied on request.
58. My feeling is that pilots especially, are being grossly misdiagnosed, mistreated and ignored by their fellow professionals. We hope that society agrees that it is our clear duty to help to urgently understand certain ‘inconvenient facts’.
59. If the correct agreed medical tests were carried out, I believe that the results would confirm what many people already seemingly secretly know.
60. This is why the testing is so slow and almost non existent. Medical help is mostly inappropriate, difficult to obtain and very badly informed.
61. I flew dangerous crop spraying aircraft and managed to survive for 8 years with no ill health. I ‘progressed’ onto ‘safe airliners’ for 16 years and without reasonable doubt got poisoned.
62. The following actions are urgently necessary:
· Compulsory, thorough independent testing of blood / fat of aircrew.
· Advise all aircrew and passengers of the potential harm from contaminated air.
· Implement House of Commons Early Day Motion # 1316 Dated: 9th January 2006, which calls for Legislation to provide the fitting of filters to all aircraft currently using bleed air systems.
· Educate the Medical profession about the near certainty of a serious health issue, which is presently leading to serious misdiagnoses and mistreatments in certain aircrew and passengers.
A full urgent ‘independent ‘enquiry is urgently requested.
Mr John Hoyte
Former BAe 146 Training Captain.
June 2007.
This issue was not well handled to begin with. Not least, the Department was slow to recognise the emerging ill health and to put measures in place to address it. We have apologised for this – and I repeat that apology today. But in turn, I think some have been slow to acknowledge the real extent of change that has taken place over more recent years, and the value of the measures put in place once the problem was recognised. So, there is no question of the MOD trying to deny or play down this ill-health. We have made clear publicly that some 1990/1991 Gulf veterans have become ill. We have recognised the seriousness of this problem for those affected and have acknowledged that this is related to Gulf service.
Extract from a speech by Derek Twigg MP, Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Veterans. Gulf War Conference, Birmingham 9th May 2007.
Summary of House of Lords Enquiry, 2007
Name: John Grahame Hoyte.
Address: xxxx
Tel: xxxx e mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
Background: Former BAe 146 Training Captain.
Presently: Chairman Aerotoxic Association. (www.aerotoxic.org)
Summary: I am an experienced, forthright and passionate ex professional pilot who has been poisoned by a seemingly unlikely cause but I am also one of the few to have recovered sufficiently to begin to work out the exact reason.
I elected not to operate a Public Transport aircraft three times in 15 months as a Training Captain on a BAe 146 aircraft due to health concerns, although largely ignorant of the real causes until approximately 3 months after being officially diagnosed as ‘chronically stressed’ by Doctors who to this day, remain ignorant or prefer to ignore certain facts.
It is a fact that the Boeing Aircraft Company and many Airlines totally understand that contaminated bleed air from jet engines is likely to cause serious ill health in pilots, cabin crew and passengers and it is overdue for this fact to become urgently understood for everybody’s sake.
Although this is extremely bad news for the aviation industry, it should be seen in the context of Global Climate Change, unnecessarily ‘low cost’ flying and the steady deterioration in the standards generally, which have been well documented over the past 15 years or more.
The fact that there are not more aircraft accidents is purely down to the increased various stresses on crews operating in unhealthy working conditions, which continue to be misunderstood and acted upon, despite overwhelming factual evidence.
The apparently invisible damage to aircrew and passengers is crucial evidence but whilst it is neither acknowledged nor admitted it will only serve to delay the eventual discovery of the effect of these toxic chemicals, which are doing serious damage to many innocent, trusting people.
A full ‘independent’ enquiry is urgently requested.
“This issue was not well handled to begin with. Not least, the Department was slow to recognise the emerging ill health and to put measures in place to address it. We have apologised for this – and I repeat that apology today. But in turn, I think some have been slow to acknowledge the real extent of change that has taken place over more recent years, and the value of the measures put in place once the problem was recognised. So, there is no question of the MOD trying to deny or play down this ill-health. We have made clear publicly that some 1990/1991 Gulf veterans have become ill. We have recognised the seriousness of this problem for those affected and have acknowledged that this is related to Gulf service”.
Extract from a speech by Derek Twigg MP, Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Veterans. Gulf War Conference, Birmingham 9th May 2007.
